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ABSTRACT 
The Smart Distributed Ledger (aka blockchain) has attracted much 
attention in recent years. According to the European Parliament, 
this technology has the potential to change the lives of many people. 
The blockchain is a data structure built upon a hashed function in a 
distributed network, enabled by an incentive mechanism to 
discourage malicious nodes from participation. The consensus is at 
the core of the blockchain technology, and is driven by information 
embedded into a data structure that takes many forms such as linear, 
tree, and graph chains. The found related information will be 
subject to various validation incentives among the miners, such as 
proof of stake and proof of work. However, all the existing 
solutions suffer from a heavy state transition before dealing with 
the problem of a validation mechanism which suffers from resource 
consumption, monopoly or attacks. This work raises the following 
question: “Why is there a need for consensus where all participants 
can make a quick and correct decision?”, and underlines the fact 
that sometimes ledger is subject to maintenance from regional 
parties in the data that leads to partial territories and eliminates 
monopoly, which is the hurdle to eliminating the trusted party. The 
validity of the blockchain transaction comes from the related 
information scattered above the data structure, and the authenticity 
lies in the digital signature. The aim is to switch from a validator 
based on incentives to a broadcaster governed by an unsupervised 
clustering algorithm, and the integrity does lie in the intersection 
among regions. However, the data structure takes advantage of the 
Petri network regarding its suitability. Building the entire ledger in 
the Petri network model will allow parallel processing of the 
transactions and securing of the total order between the participants 
on the memory reference layer. Moreover, it takes account of 
validation criteria quickly and safely before adding the new 
transaction list using the graph reachability. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Cryptopolises [28] is a world where the crypto citizen acts freely 
outside the bonds of the trusted authority. Blockchain has enabled 
cryptocurrency in real life, and it is the key to the world of 
cryptopolises. Blockchain is a data structure that is built upon a 
hashed function, then distributed among different nodes interested 
in its validity. The data structure is wrapped into a list of blocks 
linked together with sequential use of the hash function on the 
content, and each block uses the Merkle tree [21] to guarantee the 
order of transactions. Therefore, the ledger is immutable, and a 
minor change such as an order of two transactions requires 
readjusting all the hashed values. The received transactions are 
encapsulated into blocks and subjected to a consensus mechanism 
aiming to ensure that the entire network updates the distributed 
ledger with a valid transaction. 
Primarily, the first implementation of the blockchain was a solution 
to process financial transactions without the participation of a 
trusted party. It was an integration of different techniques to secure 
a chain of blocks, and the first proposal for this type of chain was 
to guarantee the integrity of a document by keeping records of each 
access and providing a secure history. It was another approach to 
the digital safety-deposit box that suffers from a lack of privacy, 
bandwidth storage, incompetence, and trust [15]. Afterwards, 
optimisation is added to the next work by the usage of a Merkle tree 
[4]. Finally comes the adoption of a consensual mechanism that can 
eliminate the sibling attacks by reusing the HashCash proof of work 
(PoW) in a race setting. Applying the same technique in the other 
field has the potential to facilitate trade, identity verification, secure 
diamond grading, tracking the shipment around the world, and 
cross-boundary payment without fees [12]. However, the technique 
suffers from scalability problems, because a search over the data 
structure is costly, and the consensus with a permissionless network 
such as Bitcoin is limited to seven transactions per second [31]. 
This work aims to answer the question of why there is a need for 
consensus where all participants can make a quick and correct 
decision by taking advantage of the structure of the Petri net, 
leading to intersected regions of interest and increasing the 
importance of certain concepts within the network. The next 
section discusses the related work on consensus within blockchain 
technology. The third section is devoted to the introduction of the 
approach by discussing the proposed data structure, the validation 
layer and governance within the network. The fourth section 
compares our proposal with the works available in the literature 
and how it can show better performance, before finishing with a 
conclusion claiming the suitability for banking and micropayment 
for the Internet of Things. 
2. RELATED WORK 
The Bitcoin [22] proposal introduced the use of Hashcash [1] to 
deter a participant who attempts to attack the security or the 
liveliness of the system. The goal was to make it virtually 
impossible for them to invest IT resources before dealing with a 
massive number of nodes interested in the validity of the ledger for 
their financial benefits. Several works have studied the Bitcoin 
proposal and its vulnerability, including [18,13]. However, 
computer resources are the only condition for having a better 
probability of winning the race by solving the problem of the NP-
complete puzzle box leading the consensus to rely on the honesty 
of 50% of the nodes [17]. This has led to the introduction of mining 
cartels and various selfish mining strategies related to it [7].  
However, the dishonest nodes will invest in the longest chain 
vulnerability to alter the global belief in which version of the data 
structure is valid [16,31]. 
The proof of stake (PoS) was a solution to solve the problem of 
computational resources, inheriting from the PoW its randomness 
by implementing the Follow the Satoshi Algorithm [6]. It comes 
from the incentive that stakeholders such as miners within the 
Bitcoin network are very interested in keeping the ledger valid. 
However, the idea leads to a monopoly exhibited by 50% of stake 
value [31]. Moreover, the ‘nothing at stake’ attack from a random 
node can coordinate a long-range attack by investing in the 
vulnerability of following the longest chain and building side one 
[11].  
The discussion on the adoption of the Byzantine fault tolerance 
BFT technique within the blockchain technology may open up a 
new possibility of solving it [14]. Lamport first proposed the 
problem on how to make the different processes reach a consensus 
on the order of an event. Castro et al. [9] proposed the Practical 
BFT that is considered the most widely used approach currently in 
the industry. Malkhi in [20] proposed the Flexible BFT and 
introduced the alive but corrupt attack, in which the attacker is 
interested in keeping the network alive but threatens its safety. 
Nevertheless, the epochs of messages that the community goes 
through with the elected leader have a high level of message 
complexity that makes it hard to implement for permissionless 
blockchain. 
The IOTA foundation proposed the use of a dynamic acyclic graph 
(DAG) by removing the concept of a block and allowing a different 
search algorithm to find the associated information on the graph 
and the transaction finality does depend on a cumulative weight 
rule [31]. However, the splitting attack is discussed and addressed 
in G-IOTA [8] by proposing a new search algorithm. Moreover, the 
approach claims the zero-fee transaction, whereas it implements 
Hashcash PoW within each participant transaction. Wang et al. [30] 
proposed the use of ReRam, a non-volatile memory, and raised 
concerns about the computing resource, which can grow massively 
when DAG also grows. 
The Petri net is a BI-Graph which has two different types of nodes. 
The network is constructed from a marking vector and two 
matrices, which are a Pre-Matrix that describes the outgoing value 
to the transition from the engaged places, and a Post-Matrix that 
describes the outgoing value from the transition to receivers’ 
places. Also, the marking vector describes the different places with 
the number of the token included, and due to the network suitability 
for formal analyses within the real-time system, different work is 
built upon it to adjust it to particular use cases. The coloured Petri 
network is the technique of associating an identity to different 
values within the place. The object Petri network is an extension of 
the coloured network to give more formal descriptive 
implementation with more functionality such as abstraction and 
inheritance. Ramchandani in [25] proposed the timed Petri net, 
which is a time-oriented performance evaluation network that is 
defined with an association of firing duration linked to a transition. 
Mathematically the Petri network is modelled as follows: 
                           PN = (P,T,Pre,Post,M0) 
P: stands for a list of places 
T: stands for a list of transactions 
Pre: pre-transaction matrix 
Post : [p×T],the post-transaction matrix 
M0: the initiation of the marking vector 
The calculation of the incidence matrix from the Pre-Matrix and 
Post-Matrix 
                      C = post − pre (1) 
The work in [19] discussed the different game theory analyses 
dedicated to the PoW; it concluded that the PoW is vulnerable to 
50% attack and to various attacks which depend on the selection of 
the forks. Moreover, it can be subjected to latency due to the selfish 
behaviour of miners or pools. PoS suffers from various 
disadvantages such as monopoly, long-range attack, uncle’s block 
and pool cartels [23]. IOTA approach suffers from centralisation 
and resource consumption that can grow massively [30].  
Moreover, BFT suffers from a high message complexity toward the 
leader that makes it unsuitable for permissionless blockchain. Thus, 
all existing methods may suffer from either a heavy state transition, 
a resource consumption mechanism or vulnerability to attacks. 
According to the European Parliament, this technology has the 
potential to change the lives of many people. Consequently, this 
work tries to drop the consensus, aiming to look at the old problem 
from a different angle where intersected regions of interest are 
implemented by taking advantage of the Petri network structure and 
raise new possibilities of solving it. 
3. THECHAIN 
TheChain’s objective is to develop a self-validation approach 
which quickly and correctly ensures the authenticity and the 
validity of each transaction within the chain before gossiping 
effectively in a network of regions. It takes advantage of the Petri 
network by imposing a tree structure in which the places dedicated 
to monitoring information linked to track balance growth of a 
public key, and the transition helps to apply rules leading to the 
construction of regions within the network. The use of graph 
reachability as a way of keeping track of balances is an effective 
way to validate transactions. The reachability concept is enabled by 
linking data structure to each other with memory references. 
Moreover, gossiping among the different nodes uses a clustering 
technique that identifies which nodes are more active in some 
regions. The intersection among regions is the key for keeping the 
coins counting in the network accurate. Consequently, regions with 
the most exchanges will always be interested in keeping each other 
regional ledger. The concept of leader election is abandoned for the 
concept of operating territories with broadcasters, and makes the 
reward a subject of reflection. In the case of rewards, the 
broadcasters will compete in the regions to create customers 
register and obtain a reward by guaranteeing to the customers that 
the transaction is public. In the absence of rewards, participants will 
be interested in keeping the network alive, and there will be no 
competition in the regions, but collaboration. However, each 
network broadcaster is assessed with the five measures that give the 
potential to be a regional coordinator, which are:  confidence, 
solitude, rapidity, leadership of broadcasting, conscience and 
ensuring the concept of finality is the key for the ideal functioning 
of the system.  
3.1 Data Structure 
TheChain is a set of transactions kept in sequential order to generate 
a different balance account after the search. The marking vector of 
the Petri network, considered as an internal wallet, describes the 
current state or the difference, which gives an overview of the IoT 
data. The incidence matrix will describe the transition by 
translating the transaction into a credit rule to an account which is 
debited or credited from it. The transaction has reference variables 
which possess the memory addresses of the next transaction and 
previous types of participants’ transactions to build a sequence of 
the linked related list. However, the system will always be 
searching to find the first unused transaction to calculate the related 
information from the attached coin objects. Secondly, it links the 
new block of transactions before setting the previous transactions 
variable with the memory reference value of the new one. Figure 1 
shows the structure of the block that contains two different types of 
components, which are wallets and transactions aggregated 
respectively into a vector of wallets named node, and a matrix of 
transactions named transition. 
 
Figure 1. The Block Data Structure 
 A definition of the used data structure can be written as follows:  
class Wallet:  
       publicKey identity;  
       double localSequentialNumber; 
       Balance blnc; 
class Coin:  
      String identifier 
      double value 
      publicKey sender 
      publicKey receiver 
Class Transaction: 
         Received timestamp  
         reference sender  
         reference receiver 
         list<Coins> Values 
The wallet class contains an identifier, a local sequential number 
that gives a precise number to how many transactions were applied 
by this identity, and a balance. The class coin contains a unique 
identifier attached to it besides its value, the last sender and 
receiver. A transaction is constructed from a list of coins, 
timestamps and memory references for management purposes. 
3.2 Transaction Validation 
Blockchain network produces a large number of partially 
independent transactions recorded together within blocks before 
making the whole chain the subject of a search for related 
information for validation. The process is burdensome, and the 
need to validate the whole chain to append a new block is 
inefficient. Therefore, a validation layer capable of handling 
parallel processing of transactions quickly and correctly to 
disseminate the validity of the block to peers is necessary for 
scalability purposes. Algorithm 1 made use of the graph 
reachability to verify if the graph can reach that state with available 
criteria.
 
Algorithm 1 validation
 
1. input :listOfTrs  
2. output :listOfvalid, VectorMarking, IncidenceMatrix 
3. wallets ← [ wallets ×N]; 
4. Transactions ← publickey × Tranferred Value; 
5. PreMatrix ← keys× Transferred Value; 
6. PostMatrix ← keys× Tranferred Value; 
7. vectorMarking ← findBalance(listpfTrs) 
8. listOfTrs, listInvalid, c←verifyTrs(listOfTrs); 
9. BlockIp(listInvalid) 
10. PreMatrix, PostMatrix ← buildMatrices(listOfTrs) 
11. IncidenceMatrix ← (PostMatrix - PreMatrix) 
12. While( i<columnSize(IncidenceMatrix) )do 
13.     VectorTemp ← VectorMarking + IncidenceMatrix [i] 
14.     if (NotAllPositive(temp)) then 
15.         DropNegative(IncidenceMatrix, listOfTrs, VectorTemp) 
16.     end 
17.     VectorMarking ← VectorTemp 
18.     i + + 
19. end 
In Algorithm 1, the information from the list of received 
transactions is used to produce a vector and three matrices. It uses 
two defined data structures, which are the wallet and the 
transaction. The wallet must contain a balance, which represents 
the value of the aggregated coins created to the attached public key. 
The transaction contains the timestamp, the identity of the receiver, 
sender and the transferred value. The algorithm starts verifying the 
validity of the transactions, such as the digital signature, time 
attached and existence of the sender. It generates two lists of valid 
and invalid transactions and flags the IP addresses from which 
invalid transactions are received in addition to c, a confidence value 
discussed later. Findbalances is a method to return from the tree a 
partial marking vector related to the attached public 
keys.BuildMatrices() generates from the transactions two matrices 
used to calculate the incidence matrix. A matrix is a vector of 
vectors. Therefore, the loop continues to add each element to the 
temporary marking vector until the end. Within the loop, the 
checking of the temporary vector from negative value is held, and 
the function DropNegative(,) will drop the change and abandon the 
associated transaction to it. If all elements are positive, the 
temporary vector is affected to the marking vector. Moreover, for 
       
       
    
         
    
                         
search limitation reasons, the public keys will be mapped into 
internal numbers. The process of validation of transaction is done 
through model checking by verifying the possibility of the graph to 
reach this state with the available criteria. However, each node 
nests a pool of transaction, with time processing that will vary with 
geographic distance dependability. 
 In [29] Nick Szabo discussed previous work by Wei Dai, with 
additional usage of cryptographic techniques which aim to 
automate the contractual relations because of the ability to 
virtualise the organisation, the intellectual and physical properties 
as entities within a distributed system. Ramchandani in [25] 
proposed the timed Petri network by attaching the value of time to 
model the temporal dynamic behaviour of a system. The contract 
proposed by Szabo and implemented by the Ethereum foundation 
functions as a proxy interface within the distributed system. This 
work injects sleeping Programming Threads within the validation 
layers and the associated time to apply the rule, which leads to the 
periodic application of the algorithm on the associated public keys.  
Table 1. Validation Tree 
 
Table 1 shows the growth of the tree within the validation layer. 
Element 0 contains six wallets; each public key mapped to an 
internal identification number associated with the balance. Element 
01 contains the application of the incidence matrix with the use of 
masking and indexing on the partial vector, which contains three 
wallets to generate a new vector for this state. The transition matrix 
is a vector of vectors that always contain as the first element the 
internal identifier, followed by the balance gain for each 
transaction, wherein the vertical side describes the transaction with 
gain to each identity. The same application is applied to element 
00, but in the element 011 the injection of a new public key is 
mapped to the value 7, and the system processes the new account 
by injecting it beside the most relevant balances, along with the 
sender. The goal is that applying the same philosophy leads to 
regions on the graph identified as a separate component. The earlier 
elements of the tree are periodically removed as they come with no 
use to validate the next transaction. A contract is a Thread 
embedded within the tree, and the element that falls under the 
branches 0000 is a contract that applies the transaction matrix every 
month. 
3.3 Injection Layer 
The validation layer wrapped the validated partial vector with the 
associated transaction in a block and distributed it to the responsible 
nodes, and internally to Algorithm 2. The injection layer is a 
persistence layer within the node, and it must secure the backup of 
transactions on the hard drive. Each transaction refers to the next 
transaction with the same identity, and the network declares the 
finality of the transaction when it converges on the total order for a 
certain global and local sequential number. Moreover, a hash table 
maps the identification number to a data structure defined in the 
class tracker, which contains the public key, the references to the 
first transaction, and the last injected transaction. The appending 
block algorithm begins by finding references to each identity on the 
list of transaction. In the case of the sender, it will change the first 
transaction reference in the tracker object, as the first coins will be 
used. Moreover, it will change for both the sender and the receiver 
the last reference as transactions added and update wallets. 
Class tracker:  
   publickey identity 
    reference first 
    reference last 
Table 2. Reference HashTable 
Internal identifier trackers 
158 Tracker1 
25 Tracker2 
856 Tracker3 
 
Algorithm 2 Appending
 
1. input :listOfTrs, Graph 
2. output : Graph 
3. i←0;  
4.  while (i<columSize(IncidenceMatrix)) do 
5.         trackerr, trackers←getTrackers(t) 
6.         UpdateFirst(trackers) 
7.         UpdateLast(trackers,, trackerr)  
8.         list← [trackers, trackerr] 
9.         UpdateHashTable(list ) 
10.        i + +; 
11. end 
12. HashValue←MerkleTree(listofTrs, timestamp) 
13. blockprevious← ComponentPower(Graph) 
14. B←  Block(listOfTrs, blockHashValue, blockre f erence) 
15. Graph.add(B) 
The Algorithm 2 will receive from the first layer an ensemble of 
information regarding the validity of transactions. It will go through 
each identity separately and get their tracker from the reference 
hash table demonstrated in Table 2. UpdateFirst is applied to the 
sender tracker to change the first reference variable as the first coins 
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are used. The UpdateLast method is applied to both the receiver 
and sender to refer to the last appended transaction. The 
UpdateHashTable, updates references for the next search before 
building the block in Block() that calculates the most relevant 
previous block in the graph by ComponentPower before adding it 
to the graph. ComponentPower will not be expensive because of 
the assumption that each cartel will maintain a region.  Figure 2 is 
an architectural demonstration of the decision chain within the 
ledger, in which Mv stands for a partial marking vector, IM for 
incidence matrice. 
 
Figure 2. Decision Chain 
3.4 Maintainers’ Governance 
Governance is the art of orchestrating nodes to work together to 
finalise transactions by identifying regions of exchange. However, 
the whole system is managed by how many coins with a unique 
identifier do exist. Consequently, adding to the fact that regions 
intersect makes it easier to track any fake coin. Moreover, a linear 
registry will work with DNS, in which it stores the history of IP 
addresses that have committed malicious behaviour in the past. 
Each block contains information about a node with proof of its 
previous behaviour. Consequently, it will derive a table for 
networking information. In addition, each node of the system is 
exceptional, with material resources and efficiency based on the 
following metrics: 
𝑠𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑢𝑑𝑒 = (
1
𝑑𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑐𝑒𝑠
)                                               (2) 
𝑟𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦 = 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝐶𝑃𝑈𝑃𝑒𝑟𝐶𝑖𝑐𝑙𝑒                            (3)                 
 power =  
𝑚𝑖 𝑛(𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒(𝑡ℎ𝑝), 𝑀𝑠𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑒)
𝑅𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑑𝑖𝑡𝑦(𝑝𝑟)
                  (4)                         
 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑐𝑖𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒(𝑛𝑜𝑑𝑒)
=  
𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑂𝑓𝐵𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘(𝑝𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐𝐾𝑒𝑦)
𝑛𝑢𝑚𝑏𝑒𝑟𝑂𝑓𝐵𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘𝑠(𝑛𝑜𝑛𝑒)
                          (5)           
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒(𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘)  =
∑ 𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑖𝑓𝑦𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒(𝑡)×𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒(𝑡)𝑁𝑖=0
𝑁
                                (6)                                
 
thp: Throughput to the system  
size: The memory space held by the throughput 
Mspace: The Alive memory space 
Pr: The peer identifier 
numberOfBlocks: Number of a block with the associated public key 
The confidence metric aims to evaluate the validity of the block, 
and for each transaction, it gives a boolean whether it succeeds or 
not. At the block level, it will produce a percentage c value 
disseminated in the event of fault behaviour to be recorded with the 
block in the DNS linear register. The solitude is a metric that 
evaluates the node by its reliability on the external computing 
machine. Moreover, the rapidity metric does depend on hardware 
devices available to the validator and the used programming 
language; however, in the initial stage, the value will be CPU clock 
dependent. The leadership of broadcasting (power) consists of 
assigning responsibilities and nodes with superior equipment to be 
candidates for the role of a star after having also evaluated their 
consciences. Conscience means the number of blocks processed 
and broadcasted by the node. The values will be calculated 
periodically and disseminated to the peers to readjust the network 
nodes by the governance algorithm described in Algorithm 3. 
The intersection among regions is key for not exhibiting any 
elimination behaviour from one part of the cartel against another. 
The system grows gradually from a few maintainers that nested 
client directory and kept serving them by making their transactions 
public, to cartels that are responsible on a regional exchange, in 
which each maintainer is responsible on a partial part of the region. 
Maintainers will grow to understand that their advantage lies in 
cooperation with each other because each region is serving clients, 
but there is always a dependency on other regions. 
 
Algorithm 3 AssignResponsability
 
1. input: chain 
2. output: rankedResponsible 
3.List←getList(chain, [blockid, recipient, sender, validator]) 
4.G←createGraph(); 
5.G.addEdges(TupleList(list[sender, recipient])); 
6.Components←G.getConnectedComponents();  
7. parse(DNSledger, List) 
7.responsible ← Intersect(components, List); 
8.rankedResponsible←rank(responsible, listOfProperties); 
Algorithm 3 begins by filtering the data in the chain, which contains 
only the transactions of the last two months, and obtains the 
characteristics of the decision. Later, the penalty DNS registry will 
be continuously analysed in the data to generate a list that 
eliminates any previous malicious node from participation. 
Intersect will generate a list of maintainers that crosscheck the 
associated components before comparably classifying them into the 
three leaders in diffusion, consciousness, and solitude metrics. The 
region assumption is based on the centralisation of the graph on 
some data point. However, regions will be interested in maintaining 
other regions due to some exchange of values between them. In the 
case of reward, it will be set automatically by the governance 
algorithm or manually by the user who is responsible for validating 
the transaction.  
3.5 Node Independency  
TheChain objective is to build self-validating nodes that are 
enabled with a layer of validation for fast and parallel treatment of 
transactions.  The network is governed by an algorithm that builds 
intersected regional maintainers.  The proposal dropped consensus, 
which means the absence of convergence on a unique ledger. The 
normal function of the system is by setting a limited number of 
coins with unique identifiers that will be exchanged between the 
different users. Maintainers will operate in their region to make 
their customers’ transactions public in exchange for a reward. It is 
                    
                  
                                                 
               
             
          
     
     
     
          
     
     
  
  
  
    
    
  
  
                  
in the interest of all the nodes to be up to date with the different 
exchanges to eliminate any fake coin generation. However, all the 
nodes will not be recording all regions’ transactions due to the 
limited resources, but the closest regions keep up to date with the 
next regions’ ledger, to build a complex sequence of regions that 
watch over the next to secure integrity, as illustrated in Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3. Regions 
The nodes are independent of any exterior dictation of data, 
consequently eliminating any double-spend or fault injection of 
data that have a high impact on the network as a whole. Moreover, 
nodes operate in regions that lead to the elimination of any attacks 
that target the network liveliness.  
4. DISCUSSION 
4.1 Safety Attacks 
This part discusses the type of attacks that intend to threaten the 
safety of the system, which means the robustness to secure regular 
operation. It focuses on a convergence of nodes on the same chain 
to finalise several transactions. The longest chain rule within the 
linear ledger approach leads a malicious node to invest in its 
vulnerability by aiming to create a side chain to double-spend. The 
attacker starts by sending a coin, treated and appended, while 
spending the same coin in a different place within a side chain. The 
attacker keeps working on the side chain to make it longer before 
making it public, consequently cancelling the transactions within 
the previous one. However, in TheChain nodes do not accept 
ledgers but a list of blocks that passes the same process of validation 
before appending it. The usage of referencing of the transaction into 
a linked series allows the different nodes to identify the double-
spend while converging to finalise the last transactions, because it 
will yield to a unique local and global sequential number.  
 
Figure 4. TheChain vs LongestChain 
Figure 4 shows the difference between the two approaches. It 
shows as well that the graph could take many forms. However, the 
total order of the chain is secured on the memory reference layer in 
which all the transactions are appended sequentially and generate a 
precise local sequential number and a balance. Different kinds of 
attacks are investing in the longest chain vulnerability, such as a 
sibling attack that invests in creating many identities within the 
system and manipulates different peers’ table to discover their 
neighbours. Nevertheless, the metric of confidence with a hard 
penalty makes this kind of attack inefficient. 
Another type of attack tries to invest in the vulnerability of the 
search algorithm over DAG or a tree structure. The Tangle [24] runs 
over a DAG by adding a transaction called ‘tip’ before waiting for 
another user to append a transaction and validate two previous tips. 
The vulnerability is that if an attacker adds two conflicted tips in 
different leaves, this leads to what is called the splitting attack [8]. 
TheChain addresses this problem with two technical choices, firstly 
by searching for the latest transaction to link the new one to it, and 
secondly by the validation layer which builds a balance from the 
different coin objects and ensures the validity before appending it. 
Figure 5 is for demonstration purposes, to define how the whole 
network is linked. Even the clients are connected via a gossip 
protocol to keep up to date with DNS ledger. Nodes have the 
capability of communicating out of their cluster. On the other hand, 
different selfish attacks in Bitcoin ideology will be advantageous 
among different nodes, such as Block withholding [2], pool 
hopping [5], and selfish miners [13]. However, this work is invested 
in such behaviour in order to build clients’ directory for the cartel 
maintainer, in which each cartel must secure the finality of the 
transaction by making it public to get rewards, leading the system 
to function as a combination of many transfer companies. 
 
Figure 5. Network 
4.2 Liveliness Attack 
The work in [17] introduced the Goldfinger attack, where platform 
competitors try to fail the system by different means; the paper 
discussed the vulnerability of a 51% attack within Bitcoin. 
However, as discussed in the previous part, the mining cartels 
concept, combined with partial responsibility, leads to the 
assumption that validators must be cooperative in exchange for a 
periodic reward. The illustrated network in Figure 6 shows how a 
malicious node must obtain the cooperation of all broadcasters to 
pass the fault transaction because of the inconsistent local and 
global sequential number that it will produce. However, if the 
number of nodes increases, the message complexity will increase 
and may lead to time delay due to difficulty to converge into a 
unique regional graph. Consequently, the resilience of such 
liveliness attacks will increase [10].  
The attacker may choose to attack stars nodes in order to fail the 
system temporarily. However, the massive number of nodes will 
lead to a large number of star governments by an algorithm, and all 
the nodes in cartels will converge to the next in the waiting list if 
the main star fails. It must be clear that stars are not leaders of 
validity as used in BFT, but leaders of broadcasting. 
4.3 Results 
This section starts by giving proof of convergence to the solution. 
Secondly, it discusses the monopoly issue in previous works and 
how the proposed system has fixed this. It demonstrates as well 
how the system deals with a huge number of malicious nodes.  
Based on Godel’s completeness theorem [32], few axioms and rules 
are needed to prove a formula. Furthermore, based on the universal 
generalisation theorem (UG), if an element of the disclosure 
universe has proved an assumption with a chain of rules deduced 
from axioms, this means the proposition applies to all elements. 
                                    
                                      
         
                                      
4.3.1 TheChain Proof of Convergence 
If a node (e) receives an invalid block (b) it will flag the sender: 
∀𝑒 ∈ 𝐷, ∀ 𝑏 ∈  𝐵 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑑(𝑒, 𝑏)
⟶  𝑓𝑙𝑎𝑔𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟(𝑒, 𝑏) ⋀ 𝑢𝑝𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒𝐷𝑁𝑆(𝑒, 𝑏) (7) 
Firstly, assume the network is with a small number of nodes. 
Consequently, the time to receive a block (b) is neglected between 
nodes (e1, e2) (9). Moreover, if a block is invalid in 𝑒1 it will be 
invalid for all other nodes (8) 
 ∀𝑒 ∈ 𝐷, ∃𝑒1𝜖𝐷, ∃𝑏 ∈ 𝐵,    𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑑(𝑒1, 𝑏) ⟶ 𝑖𝑛𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑑(𝑒, 𝑏) (8) 
∀e1, e2∈D,b∈B , TimeReceived(e1, ,b)⇔TimeReceived(e2, ,b)   
(9) 
Based on UG, if an element reaches that assumption and all nodes 
share the same proprieties, then it is valid for all of them by 
converging on the same domain (D) (11): 
D = D − r             (10) 
∃𝑒1𝜖𝐷 ,∀ e2∈D, updateDNS(𝑒1, r) ⟶Conv(𝑒1, DE1), 
Conv(𝑒2, DE2) (11) 
The network will grow massively, leading (9) to not hold any more. 
However, the governance algorithm will lead to direct contact 
between the star nodes (s), and by the addition of (12), the UG is 
valid again.  
∀𝑒 ∈ 𝐷, ∃ 𝑠 ∈ 𝐷, knowledgeable(s)→knowledgeable(e)   
(12) 
In Algorithm 3, a sorting list of nodes is returned, and each 
participant must pick the first B element as stars. If the probability 
of success in sending to the cluster is P and failure is F, picking B 
nodes receives the transaction to broadcast will make it with a 
probability of success as: 
      𝑃 =  1 − 𝐹𝐵            (13) 
Lastly, adding the following assumption that stated regions (r) 
would intersect and force nodes to be up to date with their regions: 
∃ 𝑒1, 𝑒2  ∈ 𝐷∃ 𝑟1, 𝑟2 ∈ 𝑅, 𝐼𝑛𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑡(𝑟1, 𝑟2)
⟶ 𝑟𝑒𝑔𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑈𝑝𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑(𝑒1, 𝑒2)    (14) 
∀ 𝑙 ∈ 𝐿, ∃𝑛𝑖𝐷, 𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑦𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑠(𝑛𝑖 , 𝑙) ⟶ integrity(l)     (15)  
Based on (12) and (14), and by the addition of (15), which says if 
many possess the information, then there is integrity, TheChain will 
converge in a regional way, making every node possess a special 
graph that contains its region and the intersected with it showing 
high integrity.  
4.3.2 Proof of No Monopoly in TheChain 
Automatically, the client will be assigned to a cartel. However, it 
was stated that the role of the broadcaster is to make the transaction 
public in exchange for the reward, and a client (c) can also choose 
the validator (e) manually. 
∀𝑐 ∈ 𝐶, ∀𝑒 ∈ 𝐷, 𝑐ℎ𝑜𝑠𝑒(𝑐, 𝑒) ⟶  𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑡𝑒(𝑒)         (16) 
Moreover, if a validator (𝑒1) is up to date then it will validate, get a 
reward and be interested in the ledger validity.  
∃𝑙 ∈ 𝐿, ∀𝑒1 ∈ 𝐷, ∀𝑡1 ∈ 𝑇, 𝑈𝑝𝑇𝑜𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑒(𝑒1)
⟶  𝑃𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐(𝑒1, 𝑡1)⋀𝑟𝑒𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑(𝑒1)⋀𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛(𝑒1, 𝑙)  (17) 
In conclusion, the monopoly of the system by small nodes cannot 
exist, as their function is limited to make sure it is up to date and 
makes the transaction public in exchange for a reward 
4.3.3  The Longest Chain Rule  
1. If a node (𝑛2) has more means than any node (𝑛1), this means 
𝑛2 generates more blocks than  𝑛1 
∃ 𝑛2, ∀𝑛1 ∈ 𝐷, 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑛𝑠(𝑛2, 𝑛1)
⟶ 𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑀𝑜𝑟𝑒(𝑛2, 𝑛1)⋀𝑙𝑒𝑎𝑑𝑀𝑜𝑟𝑒(𝑛2)       (18) 
2. A miner maintains the ledger for a reward. 
 ∀𝑛1 ∈ 𝐷, ∃𝑏
∈ 𝐵, 𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒𝐵𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘(𝑛1,, 𝑏)⋀𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑑𝐼𝑛𝐿𝑒𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑟(𝑏)
⟶ 𝑔𝑒𝑡𝑅𝑒𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑(𝑛1,)      (19) 
3. The choice between two valid ledgers (L1, L2) is for the longest 
∀ L1, L2 ∈ L, valid(L1)⋀valid(L2)⋀Bigger(L1, L2)
⟶  choose(L1)     (20) 
4.  A transaction (𝑡1,𝑡2) can be valid in one ledger (𝑙1,, 𝑙2) and 
invalid in another 
∃𝑙1,, 𝑙2 ∈ 𝐿, ∃ 𝑡1,𝑡2 ∈ 𝑇,
𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑑𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛(𝑙1, 𝑡1,)⋀𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑑𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛(𝑙2, 𝑡2,) ⋀ 
¬𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑑𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛(𝑙1, 𝑡2,)⋀¬𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑑𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑠𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛(𝑙2, 𝑡1,) (21) 
5. A node (n2) is interested in maintaining the version of the ledger 
where it gets the reward.  
∀𝑛2
∈ 𝐷, ∀ 𝐿1, 𝐿2, 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑅𝑒𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑( 𝐿2, 𝑛2)⋀¬𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑅𝑒𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑(𝐿1, 𝑛2)
⟶ 𝑚𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑖𝑛(𝐿2)    (22)     
Based on (18)(20)(22), the network can be monopolised by the 
nodes that have the majority resources because of the intention to 
keep getting rewards. 
4.3.4 IOTA Tangle Approach 
First, assume that the blockchain is a combination of miners and 
stakeholders. 
∀𝑛1 ∈ 𝐷 𝑙1 ∈ 𝐿, 𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘(𝐿)
⟶ 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑘𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑𝑒𝑟𝑠(𝑛1)⋁𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑟(𝑛1) (23)     
In the Tangle, there is no reward to the maintainer, but users 
validate transactions; consequently, maintainers are not interested 
in being part of the platform. 
∀ 𝑛1 ∈ 𝐷, ¬𝑟𝑒𝑤𝑎𝑟𝑑(𝑛1) → ¬𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔(𝑛1)  (24) 
The blockchain makes the transaction public among many 
maintainers to increase its integrity by eliminating the monopoly. 
∀ 𝑙 ∈ 𝐿, ∃𝑛𝑖𝐷, 𝑀𝑎𝑛𝑦𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑠(𝑛𝑖 , 𝑙) ⟶ ¬Monopoly(l)     (25)  
By the addition of the assumption that a SmallPossess is the 
negation of manyPossess (26). 
∀ 𝑙 ∈ 𝐿, ∃𝑛𝑖𝐷, 𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑠(ni, Li )  
⇔  ¬manyPossess(ni, Li ) (26)  
Based on (25) and (26) 
∃ 𝑙 ∈ 𝐿, ∀𝑛𝑖𝐷, 𝑆𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑙𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠𝑠 (𝑛𝑖 , 𝑙) ⟶ monopoly(l)     (27)  
In conclusion, IOTA tangle, by not providing a reward to a random 
validator, is conceptually vulnerable to monopoly, and from (15) 
and (27) there is no integrity either. 
4.3.5 Scenario 
The following scenario in figure 6 was implemented and tested to 
demonstrate the case if all but one element of the regions start 
acting maliciously. It was created by running four nodes to 
communicate with a set of blocks where a transaction intended to 
double-spend, while the high probability of generating blocks on 
the right side due to the use of PoW has forced node 1 to settle for 
the red register. TheChain has dealt with the problem, as shown on 
the left after communicating the local and global sequential 
number. 
 
Figure 6. TheChain vs Longest Chain rule 
Although the example was for the internal behaviour of a region, 
regions as a whole will grow to understand that any proof of 
malicious behaviour will cost them their customer to the intersected 
regions.  
4.3.6 Comparison 
Table 3. Comparison 
 Proof of Work Proof of Stake 
Network  failure 50% hash power 
[17] 
50% stake value 
[31] 
Fault data injection 50% hash power 
[27] 
50% stake 
value[31] 
Double  spend Longest Chain 
[16] 
Long-Range [11] 
Transaction 
 finality 
Longest Chain 
[31] 
Longest chain [31] 
 IOTA TheChain 
Network  failure 1/3 of network 
hashing power 
Nodes are 
independent 
Fault data injection Splitting attack [8] Nodes are 
independent 
Double  spend Splitting attack [8] Nodes are 
independent 
Transaction 
finality 
cumulative weight 
rule [31] 
Initially 100% of 
stars  
Table 3 shows a comparison of TheChain with other consensus-
based approaches.  Consensual approaches aim to converge on one 
version of the general ledger at a time. These approaches are 
vulnerable to monopoly and manipulation due to dependence on 
resources, stakes or votes. Therefore, PoS and PoW are subject to 
fault data injection, network failure and double-spend by the 
monopolist due to the reliability on the longest chain rule, as 
explained in subsection 4.3.3. IOTA has a central feature, which 
makes it vulnerable to more than the third attack alongside the data 
structure choice which is vulnerable to double spending and the 
injection of fault data by the monopolist via the splitting attack. 
However, independence in TheChain is by stopping the 
convergence on one ledger to eliminate any dictation of data and 
investing in the broadcaster intention to make the transaction public 
to secure a reward.  
The transaction finality depends on the longest chain convergence 
in PoW, PoS or the cumulative weighting rules in the IOTA 
approach. However, in TheChain is based on broadcasting 
transactions initially to all the stars before converging on the most 
relevant regions. 
The integrity of TheChain and PoW is very high due to the 
openness to any participants and the motivating reward to maintain 
the ledger. Consequently, there is a high distribution among nodes.  
Privacy is the state of being free from public attention; the various 
consensual approaches, as well as TheChain depend on public and 
private keys to validate a transaction. On the other hand, the 
problems of the link between the public key and the real identity, 
as well as the right to be forgotten are confidentiality problems; 
these problems arise from the data structure and the networking 
choices. Therefore, Table 4 shows high privacy of all techniques 
for validating a transaction within blockchain technology. Finally, 
IOTA tangle and TheChain operate over a graph that enables 
parallel treatment of transactions leading to high scalability. 
Table 4. Criteria comparison 
 Integrity Privacy Distribution Scalability 
Proof of 
work 
 High High High Low 
Proof of 
stake 
Low High Low Medium  
IOTA 
approach 
Low High Low High 
TheChain 
approach 
High High High High 
4.4 Criticism 
Although nodes must be up to date to attract more customers, some 
regions will act selfishly by abandoning the processing of some 
other regions’ transactions, due to the zero exchange of money 
between the two parties. Consequently, it declares the lack of 
theory on the regions’ behaviour. Thus, the next work will invest in 
the region’s intersection to build a solid theory for the relationship 
between region size and the network, besides enabling the multi-
label classification to attach one transaction to many validators. 
This ensures that the whole network is an intersection of many 
regions that are partially watching each other to increase integrity 
and get neighbours’ customers in case of malicious behaviour. 
5. CONCLUSION 
This work is suitable to the IoT sector and banking systems due to 
the introduction of partial responsibility on the ledger that leads to 
territories, besides the zero computational fee invested on 
transaction validation. To sum up: 
• Taking advantage of the Petri network structure to build 
the ledger and enable the total order among the 
participant on the memory reference layer, leading to 
the elimination of attacks based on forking. 
• Validation layer that uses the graph reachability to 
enable fast and parallel treatment of the transaction. 
• Introduction of the concept of region intersection to 
ensure the validity of the ledger. 
• Definition of a governance algorithm that keeps 
clustering to leads to a rapid convergence within the 
network. 
• Comparison of the proposal with previous work found 
in the literature. 
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